Once again domestic violence was at issue in a matter brought before the California Court of Appeal. In Eneaji v. Ubboe the Court ruled that a party seeking to renew a domestic violence restraining order is not required to show that there has been further abuse since the original order was issued. [FN 1] The Court also reiterated that domestic abuse is not limited to physical violence and that a restraining order can be renewed on a showing of a reasonable apprehension of nonphysical abuse.
Eneaji and Ubboe were married from March 2003 to May 2010. As part of their divorce, Ubboe requested a domestic violence restraining order based on a history of verbal and physical abuse by Eneaji. Ubboe claimed that there were countless incidents of physical abuse because whenever Eneaji became angry he would slap and punch her and “leave bruises all over her body.” On June 26, 2009, after a hearing in the divorce proceeding, Eneaji asked Ubboe for a ride to his car as they were leaving the courthouse. While they were riding in the car, Eneaji told Ubboe that she “could die” for fighting over her rights to the house they owned. In fear for her safety, Ubboe returned to the courthouse and obtained a domestic violence temporary restraining order. The temporary restraining order was extended to a three year restraining order on July 17, 2009.
On July 16, 2012, Ubboe sought a permanent renewal of the restraining order. She claimed that she continued to fear Eneaji as a result of the abuse she suffered during the marriage and because Eneaji had violated the restraining order. She alleged that, in March 2010, Eneaji followed her to church and that, in early 2011, she saw him at a Ross Dress for Less store and he tried to speak to her and waited for her outside of the store. She also claimed that there were times when she believed Eneaji was “lurking outside of her home.” Eneaji admitted seeing Ubboe at the Ross store, but denied the rest of her claims. He testified that, since the divorce, he had moved back to Nigeria, remarried and started a family, and moved on with his life.
The trial court denied the renewal request on the ground that Ubboe did not have a reasonable apprehension of physical abuse. The trial court found that, if true, the incident at Ross was too remote in time and would not by itself support the renewal of the restraining order. Further, the trial court determined that the claim that Eneaji followed Ubboe to church was also “fairly remote in time,” and that there was no certainty that Eneaji was the person outside of Ubboe’s home in 2009. Ubboe pointed out that the law did not require her to show any additional abusive conduct by Eneaji, let alone further physical abuse; it only required her to show a “reasonable fear of future abuse.” The trial court, focusing on the lack of physical violence, reasoned that “if nothing happened in three years,” there could not be a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.
The Court of Appeal disagreed. First, the Court noted that California Family Code section 6345 states that a domestic violence restraining order “may be renewed . . . either for five years or permanently, without a showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original order.” Cal. Fam. Code § 6345 (emphasis added). All that is required is a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a “reasonable apprehension of future abuse,” not future physical abuse. Ritchie v Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290. The Court noted that the existence of a restraining order and the underlying facts alone will often be enough to support the renewal. However, the trial court should also consider significant changes in circumstance, “such as whether the parties have moved on with their lives, and whether the circumstances increase the opportunity and possibility of future abuse.”
As such, the Eneaji trial court’s reasoning and analysis were erroneous in two critical ways. First, it was error to deny the renewal on the grounds that nothing happened during the three years the restraining order was in place because Section 6345 does not require a showing of any further abuse. The Court of Appeal noted that “[i]t would be anomalous to require the protected party to prove further abuse occurred in order to justify renewal of that original order. If that were the standard, the protected party would have to demonstrate that the initial order had proved ineffectual in halting the restrained party’s abusive conduct just to obtain an extension of that ineffectual order. Indeed the fact a protective order has proved effective is a good reason for seeking its renewal.”
Further, the trial court incorrectly concluded that the renewal required a reasonable apprehension of future physical abuse. The Court of Appeal noted that Family Code sections 6203 and 6320 do not limit the definition of abuse to physical injury and, instead, specify a “multitude of behavior which does not involve physical injury or assaultive acts.” In light of the Family Code’s expansive definition of domestic abuse, it follows that a fear of physical abuse is not the only ground to renew a domestic violence restraining order.
In summary, parties seeking to renew a domestic violence restraining orders are not required to suffer additional acts of domestic abuse to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of fear of future abuse. If there have been no further acts of abuse, the effectiveness of the restraining order should not be held against the party seeking to renew it. Moreover, there is no requirement that parties demonstrate a fear of physical abuse to renew restraining orders. Domestic abuse is not limited to physical injury or assaultive acts, but includes a multitude of behavior that causes emotional and psychological trauma, which should be restrained with the same vigilance as physical violence.
Dwayne A. Anderson, Esq.
Anderson Law Offices
[email protected]
www.daandersonlaw.org
[FN 1] http://www.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0914//B247885A
Eneaji and Ubboe were married from March 2003 to May 2010. As part of their divorce, Ubboe requested a domestic violence restraining order based on a history of verbal and physical abuse by Eneaji. Ubboe claimed that there were countless incidents of physical abuse because whenever Eneaji became angry he would slap and punch her and “leave bruises all over her body.” On June 26, 2009, after a hearing in the divorce proceeding, Eneaji asked Ubboe for a ride to his car as they were leaving the courthouse. While they were riding in the car, Eneaji told Ubboe that she “could die” for fighting over her rights to the house they owned. In fear for her safety, Ubboe returned to the courthouse and obtained a domestic violence temporary restraining order. The temporary restraining order was extended to a three year restraining order on July 17, 2009.
On July 16, 2012, Ubboe sought a permanent renewal of the restraining order. She claimed that she continued to fear Eneaji as a result of the abuse she suffered during the marriage and because Eneaji had violated the restraining order. She alleged that, in March 2010, Eneaji followed her to church and that, in early 2011, she saw him at a Ross Dress for Less store and he tried to speak to her and waited for her outside of the store. She also claimed that there were times when she believed Eneaji was “lurking outside of her home.” Eneaji admitted seeing Ubboe at the Ross store, but denied the rest of her claims. He testified that, since the divorce, he had moved back to Nigeria, remarried and started a family, and moved on with his life.
The trial court denied the renewal request on the ground that Ubboe did not have a reasonable apprehension of physical abuse. The trial court found that, if true, the incident at Ross was too remote in time and would not by itself support the renewal of the restraining order. Further, the trial court determined that the claim that Eneaji followed Ubboe to church was also “fairly remote in time,” and that there was no certainty that Eneaji was the person outside of Ubboe’s home in 2009. Ubboe pointed out that the law did not require her to show any additional abusive conduct by Eneaji, let alone further physical abuse; it only required her to show a “reasonable fear of future abuse.” The trial court, focusing on the lack of physical violence, reasoned that “if nothing happened in three years,” there could not be a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.
The Court of Appeal disagreed. First, the Court noted that California Family Code section 6345 states that a domestic violence restraining order “may be renewed . . . either for five years or permanently, without a showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original order.” Cal. Fam. Code § 6345 (emphasis added). All that is required is a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a “reasonable apprehension of future abuse,” not future physical abuse. Ritchie v Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290. The Court noted that the existence of a restraining order and the underlying facts alone will often be enough to support the renewal. However, the trial court should also consider significant changes in circumstance, “such as whether the parties have moved on with their lives, and whether the circumstances increase the opportunity and possibility of future abuse.”
As such, the Eneaji trial court’s reasoning and analysis were erroneous in two critical ways. First, it was error to deny the renewal on the grounds that nothing happened during the three years the restraining order was in place because Section 6345 does not require a showing of any further abuse. The Court of Appeal noted that “[i]t would be anomalous to require the protected party to prove further abuse occurred in order to justify renewal of that original order. If that were the standard, the protected party would have to demonstrate that the initial order had proved ineffectual in halting the restrained party’s abusive conduct just to obtain an extension of that ineffectual order. Indeed the fact a protective order has proved effective is a good reason for seeking its renewal.”
Further, the trial court incorrectly concluded that the renewal required a reasonable apprehension of future physical abuse. The Court of Appeal noted that Family Code sections 6203 and 6320 do not limit the definition of abuse to physical injury and, instead, specify a “multitude of behavior which does not involve physical injury or assaultive acts.” In light of the Family Code’s expansive definition of domestic abuse, it follows that a fear of physical abuse is not the only ground to renew a domestic violence restraining order.
In summary, parties seeking to renew a domestic violence restraining orders are not required to suffer additional acts of domestic abuse to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of fear of future abuse. If there have been no further acts of abuse, the effectiveness of the restraining order should not be held against the party seeking to renew it. Moreover, there is no requirement that parties demonstrate a fear of physical abuse to renew restraining orders. Domestic abuse is not limited to physical injury or assaultive acts, but includes a multitude of behavior that causes emotional and psychological trauma, which should be restrained with the same vigilance as physical violence.
Dwayne A. Anderson, Esq.
Anderson Law Offices
[email protected]
www.daandersonlaw.org
[FN 1] http://www.metnews.com/sos.cgi?0914//B247885A
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